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Abstract
To explain the process of development historically documented, we consider a model with
three economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and services) characterized by different
productivity gains and by saturation levels in the demands of agricultural and manufactured
goods. Our parsimonious model captures within a single framework the process of development
which is characterized by the structural changes in the workforce across sectors, variable growth
rates (an initial “Malthusian regime” exhibiting slow growth, a fast growth regime after a take-
off, and a gradual slow down leading to a possible new stagnation) and the relative evolutions
of prices across sectors. Reasonable calibration generates results quantitatively close to the
observed empirical facts.
Keywords: Growth model - Structural change - Unified growth - Economic development - Sat-
uration of demands
JEL Classification: O1, O4, N1
1 Introduction
There is a consensus on three major stylized facts characterizing the process of development. First,
a gradual reallocation of the labor force from agriculture to services interspaced by a temporary
but important shift in manufacturing. Second, a long period of weak growth turning suddenly into
a period of very high growth, before rapidly slowing down again (and maybe heading towards a
stagnation). Third, a fall in the prices of agricultural and manufactured products compared to
the prices of services. Well documented by economic historians, these facts remain complicated
to explain jointly by economic theory. Inspired by the model of economic development proposed
by Fourastié (1949), we develop in this paper a simple framework which reproduces these three
stylized facts.1 This theoretical growth model considers three sectors (Agriculture, Manufacturing
and Services), each of which produces an homogenous good and experiences specific (exogenous)
productivity gains, and a representative household whose key characteristic lies in the occurrence
of saturation in the demands of agricultural and of manufactured goods.
Our parsimonious model is based on two crucial assumptions; the first one relates to the rep-
resentative household and the second one to the productivity gains experienced by the producers
of the three consumption goods. The first assumption is that human being is characterized by
saturations in the demands of agricultural and manufactured goods; a human being do not eat
more and more in proportion of his revenue (Engel curve) and the same phenomena exists for
manufactured products (no one needs ten washing machines or cars); Boppart (2014) provides
evidence of a decline of the share of these goods in total expenditure. The second assumption is
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that productivity gains (resulting from accumulation of human capital, physical capital and knowl-
edge) are non-homothetic across the three sectors. In particular, the productivity gains are much
higher in manufacturing than in services. For instance, there is more productivity gains in the
manufacturing of a light bulb than in realizing a haircut. Agriculture experiences gains in between
these two extremes.
From this dynamic general equilibrium model, we derive the paths of all quantities (levels of
per capita consumptions of each of the three goods, as well as the labor partition across the three
sectors) and of all prices (relative prices in terms of the wage). Based on these two key assumptions
the model replicates accurately the three stylised facts. The formal results of our model distinguish
three different phases in the process of development. Not only the theoretical curves have the same
general patterns as the observed trajectories, but if we calibrate the parameters of our model using
somehow realistic values, we obtain quantitative results that match well empirical observations.
To run this quantitative exercise, we rely on economic history to retain sensible values for each
parameter of the model. We start running our calibrated model in year 1450 when an era of
stability occurred with the end of the Hundred Years’ war.
The first stylized fact reproduced is the structural changes in the partition of labor across
sectors. A first phase is characterized by a stable partition of labor across the three sectors; during
this phase, the weak but positive growth in agricultural productivity implies that saturation in
agricultural products is reached around 1800. In a second phase, additional productivity gains lead
to a reallocation of labor from agriculture into manufacturing and services basically because people
do not want to consume more and more agricultural products. The production of manufactured
goods increases quickly up to its saturation point, which is reached about 150 years later. Finally,
in a third phase, the services sector becomes the only one for which demand is not saturated.
Besides, as the saturation thresholds in agriculture and manufacturing have been reached, the
productivity gains in these two sectors reduce the required labor force, which gradually reallocates
in services during this third phase.
The second stylized fact reproduced by our quantitative exercise is the pattern of economic
growth. The GDP grow rate remained low during the first phase, basically because the main
share of the labor force is in the agriculture, sector characterized by medium productivity gains.
This is consistent with reality as recent studies reject the previous view of a purely stagnationist
“Malthusian epoch”. After agricultural saturation is reached, economic growth intensifies because
more workers are employed in manufacturing, the sector that experiences the strongest productivity
gains. Thanks to this mass of workers enjoying the higher productivity gains, the growth rate
quickly records a maximum. The period surrounding this peak of employment in manufacturing
corresponds to the “Thirty Glorious Years”, as named by Fourastié (1979). Once the demand
for manufactured products reaches its saturation level, the growth rate declines because of an
increasing share of the labor force work in services, the sector that exhibits the lowest productivity
gains.
Finally, our quantitative exercise enables us to reproduce a third stylized fact, as we show a
clear decline of the three real prices (in terms of the wage). Besides, we show that, as suggested by
empirical studies, the sector in which the price experiences the fastest decrease is manufacturing,
then comes agriculture, and services.
Our model offers an original way to capture the process of development, and in particular the
drastic structural changes across economic sectors. As argued in the very comprehensive state of
the literature on growth and structural transformation by Herrendorf et al. (2014), two main forces
behind the reallocation of production factors across agriculture, manufacturing and services can
be identified: technological-driven and preferences-driven. Accordingly, two ranges of literature
have been developed to assess these transformations, each of which trying to understand structural
changes through mechanisms involving either the supply-side or the demand-side.
Within supply-side theories, two approaches can be distinguished (see Herrendorf et al., 2015).
A first one consists in considering various sectors, each of which experiencing specific productivity
gains. It puts the heterogeneity of technical progress across sectors at the center of the analysis of
structural change, often by using Cobb-Douglas sectoral production functions with equal exponents
and which differ only in technical progress.2 Inspired by Fourastié (1949), the famous article
of Baumol (1967) introduces the concept of an economy with two sectors diverging in terms of
2This approach has the advantage of tractability: “under the additional assumptions of perfect competition
and profit maximization, the exponent on capital equals the share of capital in aggregate income[...], which is easily
calculated” (Herrendorf et al., 2015). However, it consider only on the part played by technical progress in structural
transformation.
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productivity gains. Following this path, Ngai & Pissarides (2007) consider differentiated rates of
technological progress among multiple sectors; then structural change is generated by changes in
relative prices. Complementarily, Acemoglu & Guerrieri (2008) underline that structural change
can also be the result of sectoral differences in the capital intensity which imply that technological
change goes along with an increase in the capital-to-labor ratio.
Alternatively, demand-side theories put forward the part played by non homothetic prefer-
ences (in order to introduce some heterogeneity in income elasticities of demand across sectors)
in structural changes. Various forms of utility functions have been considered.3 In particular, in
Kongsamut et al. (2001), productivity gains are uniform across sectors and all structural change
is driven by income effects that are generated by Stone-Geary preferences. The use of the Stone-
Geary utility function allows the existence of a subsistence level of consumption of the agricultural
good that must be achieved by the household. Only once this minimum level is reached, the house-
hold may begin to consume other goods. Accordingly, this type of preferences makes possible to
formalize structural change. Besides, assessing the importance of the preferences in the process
of structural change using post-1947 U.S. data, Herrendorf et al. (2013) show that the utility
function used by Kongsamut et al. (2001) provides a good fit to the data. However, Stone-Geary
preferences present a major drawback: for sufficiently low levels of income, the consumption of
services and thus the share of labor in services may be nil.
Boppart (2014) reconciles the two forces of structural changes hereinbefore mentioned. On
the demand side, he uses a type of price-independent generalized-linear (PIGL) preferences which
generates reallocation of labor across sectors over time while avoiding the drawback involved by
Stone-Geary preferences. He combine it with sector-specific productivity gains on the supply-side.
Yet, as argued by Comin et al. (2015), this specification can “only accommodate two goods with
distinct income elasticities”. Comin et al. (2015) extend this approach to an arbitrary number
of goods and furthermore introduces heterogeneous productivity gains as in Ngai & Pissarides
(2007). The resulting framework reproduces well structural changes by considering both long-run
demand and supply drivers. Likewise, our model builds both on demand and on supply sources
of structural changes. As in most supply-side theories, we consider three sectors that experience
different productivity gains. Besides, we use an original approach to formalize non homothetic
preferences which appear to be more consistent with historical facts: our assumption of saturations
in the demands of agricultural and manufactured goods does not prevent the fact that the household
consumes the three goods from the beginning (unlike the Stone-Geary specification in which the
household start to consume other goods only after reaching the subsistence level).4
The hereinbefore mentioned models capture the structural changes historically documented,
but they are not able to explain the changes in the growth trends in the long run (especially, they
do not explain the economic take-off). More generally, most of the growth models are unable to
generate within a single framework the slow growth observed for centuries, the economic take-off
and the decreasing growth we observe for a few decades. Malthusian models reproduce the growth
process during the Malthusian epoch, but are not able to explain the transition to the economic
take-off. Standard growth models relying on exogenous technological change (e.g. Solow, 1956)
or relying on endogenous technological change (e.g. Romer, 1990; Grossman & Helpman, 1991;
Aghion & Howitt, 1992) reproduce accurately the growth process of the developed economies.
However, they are not able to generate neither the origin of the take-off nor the recent decrease in
growth rates.
Other models have been proposed to capture the process of the economic development as a
whole. For instance, Hansen & Prescott (2002) explain the economic transition by a technological
exogenous progress making manufacturing productive enough to attract resources from agriculture.
The most exhaustive work on the matter is the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005), in which the
process of development is explained in the light of demography and investment in human capital.
A larger population allows an increase in the technological progress, but with development, parents
decide to reduce fertility to privilege quality of children required to fit in a more technologically
advanced economy. The trigger mechanism thus consists in reaching a critical size of population,
whereas in our model, the take-off occurs when satiety in agricultural product is reached, that is
when the cumulated productivity gains have been sufficient. Unified Growth Theory captures well
3For instance, Matsuyama (1992), Echevarria (1997), Laitner (2000), Kongsamut et al. (2001), Gollin et al.
(2002) use quasi-homothetic intra-temporal preferences; while Zweimueller (2000), Matsuyama (2002), Foellmi &
Zweimueller (2008) and Buera & Kaboski (2012) use hierarchy of needs to consider non-homotheticity.
4This feature seems to match reality; indeed, it appears that even when suffering from starvation households
consume a minimum of manufactured products (e.g. agricultural tools, culinary utensils) and of services (e.g.
collective services of security).
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three phases of economic growth: a Malthusian stagnation, a transition and a period of strong
growth. Our model also depicts several alike phases; however, it offers a better fit with data
showing a first period characterized by a weak but positive growth for a long time period, then a
gradual rise during the economic take-off leading to the highest growth rates in the middle of the
twentieth century. Besides, our model also enables us to formalize the slowdown in growth that has
been observed for a few decades. Furthermore, contrary to the UGT framework, our model does
not require to consider either demographic transition or investment in human capital in order to
reproduce the stylized facts. This omission is however not totaly inconsistent with historical facts.
Indeed, industrialization started first in England whereas, at the same time, France pioneered the
demographic transition and Germany was the leader in terms of literacy rates. One could thus
argue that economic development, demographic transition and investment in human capital are
three partially independent phenomena. For sure, human capital as well as other social factors
play a role in the development but in our model the aggregated effect of these factors is captured
by the level of productivity gains. These different productivity gains (which result from various
factors stressed in the literature) explain the discrepancy in the timings of development across
human communities.
In fact, when most existing models tend to consider relatively complex formalization and to
study complex dynamics, our model exhibits simple mechanisms and yet still manages to repro-
duce accurately several major stylized facts simultaneously. Introducing differentiated productivity
gains across sectors and saturations in the demands of agricultural and manufactured goods, our
model depicts the structural changes in the labor force (a gradual reallocation across agriculture,
manufacturing and services) as well as the changes in growth observed over time, especially the
weak growth observed for centuries and the very strong growth reached in the middle of the 20th
century. Therewith, it enables us to tackle a contemporary (early 21st century) issue, obviously not
apprehended by older research: the declining growth rates and the beginning of a possible secular
stagnation. Finally, our model also exhibits divergent evolutions of the real prices in agriculture,
manufacturing and services.
Along with the principle of Occam’s razor, we retain this very simple model even if more
sophisticated versions (including endogenous physical capital accumulation, the use of land in the
agriculture, population growth, or endogenous technical progress) could enable us to reproduce
additional stylized facts. The model presented in this paper is voluntarily kept simple to emphasize
the key mechanism underlying well documented stylized facts regarding the process of development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents the three stylized facts repro-
duced by our model. Section 3 presents the model and the main theoretical results explaining
economic changes. Section 4 exhibits the quantitative exercise. All figures are presented in the
appendix.
2 Stylized Facts
The process of economic development has been characterized by three important stylized facts.
The first stylized fact regarding the process of economic development lies in dramatic movements
in the repartition of the workforce across the main sectors of the economy. Following Fisher (1939),
economic activity is often rudely divided in three important sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and
services. At the end of the Middle Ages, about 70% of the labor force worked in the agriculture;
for instance, 71% in France and 74% in England in 1400, according to Allen (2001). In other
words, less than one third of the population worked in manufacturing and services. From this
initial situation, one observes a constant decline in the share of the labor force in the agriculture:
68% in 1600, 63% in 1700 and 60% in 1800 for the case of France (Allen, 2001); these changes
started earlier in England (Wallis et al., 2017). In 1800, at the eve of the economic take-off,
22% of the population worked in manufacturing and 14% in services. One century later, in 1900,
manufacturing and services each employed 30% of the population; agriculture still employing the
remaining 40%. While the share of the labor force continued to decline in the agriculture, it
pursued its rise in services; a peak of employment was observed in manufacturing in the middle of
the 20th century. In a study made on 25 developed countries for the 20th century, Feinstein (1999)
reports that each of them recorded a peak in the share of employment in manufacturing, spanning
from 1955 for the UK to 1982 for Greece. Each of these peaks have reached different levels, ranging
from 30.2% in Greece (observed in 1982) to 49.3% in West Germany (observed in 1970). These
structural changes have been extensively documented for decades (e.g. Fourastié, 1949; Kuznets,
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1957, 1966; Chennery, 1960; Kongsamut, 2001). A recent very illustrative figure from Herrendorf
et al. (2014) is reproduced in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Around here
The second stylized fact regards the evolution of the speed of the process of economic develop-
ment as measured by GDP per capita. The process of economic growth can indeed be divided in
three successive phases. The longest part of the economic history often called “Malthusian epoch”
was characterized by a weak but positive economic growth per capita.5 While a form of stagna-
tion was for long hypothesized, the most recent estimations show that growth was very low but
positive for centuries before the period known as the economic “take-off”. Especially for agricul-
ture, prominent historians have demonstrated that both output and productivity per capita rose
significantly in the 16th and 17th centuries (Allen 1999). This observation of a growth of GDP
per capita, even if limited in magnitude, is confirmed at the wage level (Humphries & Weisdorf,
2016). Updating the Maddison project database, Bolt & van Zanden (2014) provide accurate long
run data for UK and Netherland. They document average growth rates of GDP per capita of
0.24% per year in Netherland and of 0.21% per year in England between the 14th century and
1800. In a second phase, developed countries recorded an annual increase of the GDP per capita
above 1.5% between 1800 and 2000 (e.g. 1.53% in Netherland and 1.79% in England). This phase
encompasses the economic take-off characterized by industrialization as well as the short period of
very high growth of the “Thirty Glorious” years.6 Regarding the potential third phase, there is a
current debate about a potential secular stagnation (Teulings & Baldwin, 2014). Indeed, the most
developed countries have experienced growth rates below 1% during the last decade (e.g. Piketty,
2014; Bolt & van Zanden, 2014). These three phases of economic development are illustrated in
Figure 2 for England and Netherland (1300-2015).
Fig. 2. Around here
The third stylized fact is the historical evolution of prices in each sectors. The historical increase
of the relative price of hand-made services is the famous Baumol’s cost disease which “refers to the
tendency of costs and prices in a number of services, notably healthcare, education, legal services
and live artistic performance, to rise persistently and cumulatively faster than the rate of inflation”
(Baumol, 2004). Contrarily, the prices of investments goods (which are mainly manufactured
goods) exhibit a strong decline over time, as documented by Karabarbounis & Neiman (2014).
Relative prices of the agricultural products are on a well-known declining trend from the beginning
of the economic take-off. As an illustration of the evolution of prices in the three sectors, Figure
3 depicts the evolution of the prices of bread, electric bulb and male haircut, expressed in number
of hours of a standard worker wage (i.e. each year, the current price is divided by the current
hourly wage).7 These three products are each typical of one of the three sectors and have remained
similar over time. An unqualified worker could buy a 2kg loaf of bread in exchange for 2.5 hours
of work in 1912; today it requires only half an hour. In 1912, the price of producing one electric
light bulb represented six hours of unqualified wage labor whereas the price in 2015 is no more
than twelve minutes. As a typical case in the tertiary sector, a male haircut still represents more
than one hour of unqualified work as it did in 1912; the relative price is about stable.
Fig. 3. Around here
3 The Model
There are four goods: three consumption goods and labor. Consumption goods are produced
by three sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and services. Each sector produces an homogenous
good. We denoted by pAt , by p
M
t , and by p
S
t , the prices at date t of the agricultural good, of the
manufactured good, and of the services. As it will be detailed below, these sectors are characterized
by different technological growth rates; moreover, we consider saturation levels in the consumptions
5As explained by Guinnane and Ogilvie (2008), the expression “Malthusian” is used by economists to describe the
economic context existing before the take-off but without assuming the theory of Malthus made of three relationships
i. births depend on economic condition, ii. deaths depend on economic conditions, and iii. economic condition is a
negative function of the number of people using a given stock of capital and natural resources.
6Fourastié forged this expression as the title of a book published in 1979.
7These series have been initially collected by Jean Fourastié and updated by his daughter Jacqueline Fourastié
and made available on the website of the Comité Fourastié (http://stats.fourastie-sauvy.org/).
5
of the agricultural good and of the manufactured good. Besides, at each date t, there are L identical
households, each of which is endowed with one unit of labor that is supplied inelastically; the total
quantity of labor L is used in the agriculture (quantity LAt ), in manufacturing (quantity L
M
t ) and
in the services (quantity LSt ). Hence, at each date t, the constraint on the labor market is
L = LAt + L
M
t + L
S
t (1)
The wage is denoted by wt. According to Walras’ law, we can normalize wt to one.
In Section 3.1, we present the preferences and the behavior of the representative household. In
particular, we introduce a utility function which exhibits saturations in the demands for agricultural
and manufactured goods, and we derive the demand functions. Then, in Section 3.2, we present
the technologies and the producers’ behavior. Finally, the general equilibrium is characterized
in Section 3.3; for each of the three phases, we derive the relative prices (in terms of the wage),
and we compute the equilibrium quantities of per capita consumptions and the equilibrium labor
partition.
3.1 Preferences and consumer’s behavior
Let at, mt, and st, denote the representative household’s consumptions of the goods produced by
the agricultural, manufacturing, and the services sectors, respectively. A key point is to allow the
representative household’s preferences to consider possible saturations in the demands for rival
goods. The saturation levels of the demand for the agricultural good and of the demand for the
manufactured good are denoted by aˉ and by mˉ, respectively. We assume that at each date t
the instantaneous preferences of the representative household’s are given by a Cobb-Douglas with
saturations utility function:8
U (at,mt, st) = (at)α(mt)μ(st)σ, with at ≤ aˉ,mt ≤ mˉ and α + μ + σ = 1 (2)
At each date t, the representative household maximizes (2) subject to her budget constraint:
pAt at + p
M
t mt + p
S
t st = 1(≡ wt) (3)
Let us denote by taˉ and tmˉ the dates at which the saturation levels of the demands for agricultural
and manufactured goods are reached, that is such that
at = aˉ, ∀t ≥ taˉ and mt = mˉ, ∀t ≥ tmˉ (4)
According to well established stylized facts, we consider that the saturation of the demand for the
agricultural good occurs before the one of the demand for the manufactured good; formally, we
will focus on values of the parameters such that taˉ < tmˉ. Given this assumption, this framework
gives rise to three successive phases. In Phase I, neither the saturation level of the demand for
the agricultural good, nor the one of the demand for the manufactured good have been reached
(t < taˉ). In Phase II, the saturation level of the demand for the agricultural good has been reached,
while it is not the case yet for the demand for the manufactured good (taˉ ≤ t < tmˉ). In Phase III,
both saturation levels have been reached (tmˉ ≤ t).
In the three following lemmas, we derive for each of these three phases the demand functions
of the representative household.
Phase I - No saturations: at < aˉ and mt < mˉ (t < taˉ)
If no saturation level has been reached, that is if t < taˉ, the program of the representative household
is
Max U (at,mt, st) = (at)α(mt)μ(st)σ subject to pAt at + pMt mt + pSt st = 1
One obtains the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Before any saturation occurs (i.e. ∀t such that t < taˉ), the demand functions for the
agricultural good, for the manufactured good, and for services are
at =
α
pAt
,mt =
μ
pMt
, and st =
σ
pSt
(5)
8The assumptions retained on preferences have been chosen in order to get simple closed form solutions and, as
explained above, they do not prevent us from developing a model which replicates accurately the stylized facts. In
particular, we could have considered a more complex utility function to account for saturations and we could also
have considered an intertemporal utility function.
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Because saturations have not been reached, one gets the standard demand functions resulting
from a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Phase II - Saturation in the demand for the agricultural good and no saturation in
the demand for the manufactured good: at = aˉ and mt < mˉ (taˉ ≤ t < tmˉ)
At date taˉ, the demand for the agricultural good reaches its saturation level aˉ; then, the demand
is at = aˉ, ∀t ≥ taˉ. From this date, and as long as the demand for the manufactured good has not
reached its saturation level mˉ (i.e. ∀t ∈ [taˉ; tmˉ[), the program of the representative household is
Max U (aˉ,mt, st) = aˉα(mt)μ(st)σ, subject to pMt mt + pSt st = 1− pAt aˉ
One gets the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Once the saturation level of the demand for the agricultural good has been reached, and
until the saturation level of the demand for the manufactured good is reached, that is ∀t ∈ [taˉ; tmˉ[,
the demand functions for the agricultural good, for the manufactured good, and for services are
at = aˉ,mt =
μ(1− pAt aˉ)
(μ + σ)pMt
, and st =
σ(1− pAt aˉ)
(μ + σ)pSt
(6)
In Phase II, the demands of the three goods depend not only on the revenue and on the prices
(as in Phase I), but also on the saturation level aˉ.
Phase III - Saturation in the demands for agricultural and manufactured goods: at = aˉ
and mt = mˉ (tmˉ ≤ t)
If tmˉ ≤ t, then the demand for the agricultural good and the demand for the manufactured
good have both reached their saturation levels: at = aˉ and mt = mˉ. The budget constraint of
the representative household then writes pSt st = 1 − pAt aˉ − pMt mˉ. Accordingly, one obtains the
following lemma.
Lemma 3. Once the saturation levels of the demand for the agricultural good and of the demand
for the manufactured good have been reached (i.e. for all t such that tmˉ ≤ t), the demand functions
for the agricultural good, for the manufactured good, and for services are
at = aˉ,mt = mˉ, and st =
1− pAt aˉ− pMt mˉ
pSt
(7)
In Phase III, the demands of the three goods now depend on the revenue, on the prices, and
on the two saturation levels aˉ and mˉ.
3.2 Technologies and producers’ behavior
The production of the agricultural good, of the manufactured good and of services requires the
use of labor (in quantities LAt , L
M
t and L
S
t , respectively). Besides, each of the three sectors is
characterized by its own productivity level χXt (X = A,M,S), whose growth rate, gχXt = χ˙
X
t /χ
X
t ,
is exogenous. We will return to the assumptions we make on these growth rates below in Section 4,
when we run the quantitative exercise. One can think of these productivity parameters as reflecting
jointly the levels of physical capital, of human capital, and of technological knowledge reached in
each of the three sectors.9 The production functions are
At = χAt L
A
t ,Mt = χ
M
t L
M
t and St = χ
S
t L
S
t (8)
where At, Mt and St denote the total output of agriculture, of manufacturing, and of services,
respectively. We use a very simple formalization (Cobb-Douglas with labor as the sole input)
in order to emphasize the key role played by non-homothetic productivity gains across sectors.
Furthermore, as it will be developed below in 3.3, in spite of their simplicity, these assumptions on
technologies when joined to the assumption on the saturations in the demands of agricultural and
manufactured goods enables us to obtain straightforwardly results that replicate well the stylized
facts presented in Section 2. One could consider production functions depending more explicitly
9One could also consider that they are influenced by other factors such as institutions, human factors.
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on various inputs such as land, physical capital, human capital, knowledge.10 However, this extra
complexity is not necessary to replicate the stylized facts.
The markets for the agricultural good, manufactured good and services are perfectly competi-
tive. In each sector, firms maximize their profits πXt = p
X
t χ
X
t L
X
t − LXt (X = A,M,S). Since one
consider constant returns in production functions with one input, perfect competition implies that
the three supply functions are perfectly elastic: pXt = 1/χ
X
t (X = A,M,S).
3.3 Equilibrium
We can now compute the general equilibrium (prices and quantities) for each of the three phases.
Given the supply functions, as seen in Lemma 4 below, the prices are given by the same expression
in each of the three phases.
Lemma 4. In the three phases, the price of the agricultural good, of the manufactured good, and
of the services are
pAt = 1/χ
A
t ; p
M
t = 1/χ
M
t and p
S
t = 1/χ
S
t , respectively. (9)
Then, the quantities at, mt and st of per capita consumptions, and the quantities LAt , L
M
t and
LSt of labor for each phase are provided in the three propositions below.
Phase I - No saturations: at < aˉ and mt < mˉ (t < taˉ)
In the following proposition, we exhibit the results for Phase I.
Proposition 1. Before any saturation occurs (i.e. ∀t such that t < taˉ), the equilibrium labor
partition is
LAt = αL,L
I
t = μL and L
S
t = σL; (10)
and the equilibrium per capita consumptions of the agricultural good, the manufactured good and
services are
at = αχAt ,mt = μχ
M
t and st = σχ
S
t , respectively. (11)
Proof. From (5) and (9), one gets the per capita consumptions levels: at = αχAt , mt = μχ
M
t
and st = σχSt . Then, the labor partition is derived from market clearing conditions. One has
At = Lat ⇔ χAt LAt = LαχAt ⇔ LAt = αL; Mt = Lmt ⇔ χMt LMt = LμχMt ⇔ LMt = μL; and
St = Lst ⇔ χSt LSt = LσχSt ⇔ LSt = σL. ¤
During Phase I, as shown in (10), the share of labor devoted to each sector is constant and
depends on the preferences of the representative household. Besides, as shown in (11), the con-
sumption of the agricultural good, of the manufactured good, and of services increase according to
at = αχAt , mt = μχ
M
t and st = σχ
S
t , respectively. The demand for the agricultural good reaches
its saturation level aˉ at the end of Phase I, that is at date taˉ: αχAtaˉ = aˉ. At this date one enters
Phase II, in which consumption henceforth remains constant: at = ataˉ = aˉ, ∀t ≥ taˉ.
Phase II - Saturation in the demand for the agricultural good & no saturation in the
demand for the manufactured good: at = aˉ and mt < mˉ (taˉ ≤ t < tmˉ)
In the following proposition, we exhibit the results for Phase II.
Proposition 2. Once the saturation level of the demand for the agricultural good has been reached,
and before the saturation level of the demand for the manufactured good has been reached, that is
∀t ∈ [taˉ; tmˉ[, the equilibrium labor partition is
LAt =
aˉ
χAt
L,LMt =
μ
μ + σ
(
1− aˉ
χAt
)
L and LS =
σ
μ + σ
(
1− aˉ
χAt
)
L; (12)
10In particular, it appears more realistic to introduce the use of land in the agriculture, and the use of physical
capital in manufacturing. We consider extensions of our model (available upon request), in which the production of
the agricultural (resp. manufactured) good is formalized by a Cobb-Douglas with two inputs: labor and land (resp.
physical capital). These generalizations do not change significantly the key features of our model, even though they
enable it to replicate even more accurately the stylized facts of interest. Furthermore, the choice of Cobb-Douglas
could also be debated; however, in addition to its tractability, Herrendorf et al. (2015) show that “Cobb-Douglas
sectoral production functions that differ only in technical progress capture the main technological forces behind the
postwar US structural transformation”.
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and the equilibrium per capita consumptions of the agricultural good, the manufactured good and
services are
at = aˉ,mt =
μ
μ + σ
(
1− aˉ
χAt
)
χMt and st =
σ
μ + σ
(
1− aˉ
χAt
)
χSt , respectively. (13)
Proof. From (9), one has pAt = 1/χ
A
t , p
M
t = 1/χ
M
t and p
S
t = 1/χ
S
t . Plugging in (6), one has mt =
μ(1−pAt aˉ)
(μ+σ)pMt
= μ(1−aˉ/χ
A
t )
(μ+σ)/χMt
= μμ+σ
(
1− aˉ
χAt
)
χMt and st =
σ(1−pAt aˉ)
(μ+σ)pSt
= σ(1−aˉ/χ
A
t )
(μ+σ)/χSt
= σμ+σ
(
1− aˉ
χAt
)
χSt .
Market clearing conditions give the labor partition: At = Lat ⇔ χAt LAt = Laˉ ⇔ LAt = aˉχAt L;
Mt = Lmt ⇔ χMt LMt = L μμ+σ
(
1− aˉ
χAt
)
χMt ⇔ LMt = μμ+σ
(
1− aˉ
χAt
)
L; and St = Lst ⇔ χSt LSt =
L σμ+σ
(
1− aˉ
χAt
)
χSt ⇔ LSt = σμ+σ
(
1− aˉ
χAt
)
L. ¤
While during Phase I, the labor partition across the three sectors was constant, Phase II is
characterized by structural changes (i.e. a reallocation of the labor force across the broad sectors
agriculture, manufacturing and services): as seen in (12), the quantity of labor devoted to agri-
culture decreases; this freed labor force reallocates into manufacturing and services. Furthermore,
As shown in (13), during this phase, the consumption of the agricultural good (having reached
its saturation level at date taˉ) remains constant and equal to aˉ. Furthermore, the consumptions
of the manufactured good and of services now increase along with mt = μμ+σ
(
1− aˉ/χAt
)
χMt and
st = σμ+σ
(
1− aˉ/χAt
)
χSt , respectively. At date t
mˉ (end of Phase II), it is now the turn of the
demand for the manufactured good to reach its saturation level mˉ: μμ+σ
(
1− aˉ/χAtmˉ
)
χMtmˉ = mˉ.
Henceforth, the consumption of manufactured goods remains mt = mtaˉ = mˉ, ∀t ≥ tmˉ.
Phase III - Saturation in the demands for both agricultural and the manufactured
good: at = aˉ and mt = mˉ (tmˉ ≤ t)
The following proposition exhibits the results for Phase III.
Proposition 3. Once the saturation levels of the demands for the agricultural good and for the
manufactured good have been reached, that is for ∀t ≥ tmˉ, the equilibrium labor partition is
LAt =
aˉ
χAt
L,LMt =
mˉ
χMt
L and LS =
(
1− aˉ
χAt
− mˉ
χMt
)
L; (14)
and the equilibrium per capita consumptions of the agricultural good, the manufactured good, and
services are
at = aˉ,mt = mˉ, and st = χSt
(
1− aˉ
χAt
− mˉ
χMt
)
, respectively. (15)
Proof. For any t ≥ tmˉ, one has at = aˉ and mt = mˉ. From (7), one has st = 1−p
A
t aˉ−pMt mˉ
pSt
;
using the prices (pAt = 1/χ
A
t , p
M
t = 1/χ
M
t and p
S
t = 1/χ
S
t ) derived in (9), one gets st =
1−aˉ/χAt −mˉ/χMt
1/χSt
=
(
1− aˉ
χAt
− mˉ
χMt
)
χSt . Market clearing conditions give the labor partition: At =
Lat ⇔ χAt LAt = Laˉ ⇔ LAt = aˉχAt L; Mt = Lmt ⇔ χ
M
t L
M
t = Lmˉ ⇔ LMt = mˉχMt L; and
St = Lst ⇔ χSt LSt = L
(
1− aˉ
χAt
− mˉ
χMt
)
χSt ⇔ LSt =
(
1− aˉ
χAt
− mˉ
χMt
)
L. ¤
As seen in (14), Phase III (like Phase II) is also characterized by structural changes. The
quantity of labor devoted to agriculture continues to decrease. After reaching a peak at date tmˉ,
the quantity of labor devoted to manufacturing starts to decline. The labor force freed from these
two sectors reallocates into services. Besides, as shown in (15), during Phase III, the consumption
of the agricultural good and of services, which have both reached their saturation levels (at dates
taˉ and tmˉ, respectively), remain constant and equal to aˉ and mˉ, respectively. Finally, from date tmˉ
(end of Phase II / beginning of Phase III) the only consumption increasing is the one of services:
st = χSt
(
1− aˉ
χAt
− mˉ
χMt
)
.
Fig. A, B and C. Around here
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Our model - which considers saturations of the demands for rival goods and non-homothetic
productivity gains - leads to clear theoretical results (independently of the calibrations that will
be made below in Section 4). Figures A, B and C summarize and illustrate the general equilibrium
results provided in Lemma 4 and Propositions 1, 2 and 3: economic development is characterized
by three distinct phases, the patterns of which match major stylized facts.
First, as shown by (10), (12) and (14), the model exhibits structural changes in the labor par-
tition across sectors (see Figure A). Assuming α > μ > σ, Phase I is characterized by more labor
in the agriculture than in manufacturing and in services; assuming furthermore that gχMt > gχSt ,
Phase II sees a reallocation of labor from the agriculture into the two others sectors (more into
manufacturing than into services at first); and during Phase III, the shares of labor in manufactur-
ing and in services asymptotically vanish, all the labor force being reallocated into services in the
long run. Second, as shown by (11), (13) and (15), assuming that gχMt > gχAt > gχSt , the model
replicates the observed changes in the structure of consumptions (see Figure B). Indeed, under
this assumption, Phase I exhibits the development of the agriculture first, followed successively
by the ones of manufacturing and of services, while Phase II sees the share of income devoted
manufactured goods increases faster that the one devoted to services.11 Third, as seen in (9), the
model reproduced the evolution of prices which all decrease differently according to the productiv-
ity gains (see Figure C, in which prices are expressed in terms of the wage and their initial values
are normalized to unity).
In Section 4 below, we illustrate the capability of the model to reproduces accurately well
established empirical observations. As seen in 4.2, this qualitative exercise enables us to show
that our model not only reproduces well overall patterns of economic development but - given a
reasonable calibration (see 4.1) - also generates results quantitatively close to the observed facts
(see Section 2 above).
4 Quantitative Exercise
In order to run some quantitative analysis, we need to calibrate the parameters of the model.
In that respect, we rely on economic history to determine rough but sensible values for each
of these parameters. Two sets of parameters are required. First, we need calibrations for the
parameters of the representative household’s preferences: the saturation thresholds of the demands
for agricultural products and for manufactured products ( aˉ and mˉ), and the parameters of the
Cobb-Douglas utility function (i.e. the weights α, μ and σ put on each of the three goods in the
preferences). Second, on the production side, we need to calibrate the productivity gains in each
of the three sectors, and in particular their long run growth rates (gχAt for agriculture, gχMt for
manufacturing and gχSt for services).
In this section, we provide a basic calibration based on available empirical observations. The
use of such rough values constitutes, of course, a methodological simplification of the reality. To
demonstrate the robustness of our model, we then provide the results of alternative calibrations
below in 4.4.1. Simulations are run for the period 1450-2350.
4.1 Calibration
4.1.1 Preferences of the representative household
Saturation levels of the demands for rival goods (aˉ and mˉ)
Regarding the saturation thresholds in agricultural and manufactured products, we look for sensible
coefficients of multiplication between the initial level of the demand and its saturation threshold.
For the saturation level aˉ of the demand for the agricultural good, we deduce a level of satiety
from long-term data on food consumption. A first indication is offered by the comparisons of
calories absorbed then and now. The subsistence level is about 1,200 Kcal per day for one person.
Today, the worldwide highest consumption is observed in Austria with 3,800 Kcal per day (FAO
data). This level represents a multiplicative by about 3. This factor of multiplication is probably
a minimum and we can estimate that the current calories consumption is made of higher quality
products (e.g. the consumption of apple has probably been multiplied by a higher figure but
11Figure B describes the evolution of the equilibrium per capita quantities of each of the three goods. Hence, it
does not exactly represent the stylized fact regarding the evolution of GDP per capita depicted in Figure 2 above.
In that respect, one needs to aggregate those three quantities to obtain a measure of GDP per capita. In 4.2, we
compute a standard real GDP per capita using, as common basis of aggregation, the initial prices (see Figure 4).
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there is no doubt that a saturation also occurred). Studying a luxury good, the consumption of
champagne has been multiplied by 13 between 1900 and today; 157.74 million of bottles have been
drunk in France in 2016 meaning 2.35 bottle per French per year versus 7.43 million or 0.18 per
French in 1900 (data from the Comité Interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne). As a matter of
calibration, we roughly retain a multiplicative factor of 5.
As for the saturation level mˉ of the demand for the manufactured good, its estimation is more
delicate. Using historical studies on various industrial activities, we inferred a rough estimation.
Metallurgical industry in Europe provides a first indication. In 1400, the total consumption was
between 25 and 30 thousand tons (Sprandel, 1969) for a population of 45 million, that is between
0.55 and 0.66 kilograms per capita. Nowadays, the total consumption amounts to 150 million of
tons (Eurofer report 2016) for a population of 508 million, that is a consumption of 295 kilograms
per capita, which has remained relatively stable for a few decades.12 Therefore, the coefficient of
multiplicative between the initial level of the demand and its saturation threshold lies between
443 and 531. A second indication is provided by the change in the annual level of CO2 emissions.
In the 1800, the industrialization in the US was very weak as reflected by a level of 0.03 tons
per capita. Nowadays, this figure has reached 16 tons, that is a multiplicative factor of 533 (see
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center through Gapminder website).13 Another hint can be
obtained from the consumption of shoes. Every American purchased 7.5 pairs of shoes in 2013.
In 200 BC, Cato the Elder recommended to provide each worker with one pair of robust shoes
every other year (De Agri Cultura, LIX). Hence a multiplicative factor of 15.14 As a matter of
calibration, we roughly retain a multiplicative factor of 400.
These estimations are necessarily a bit coarse; nevertheless, our theoretical framework appears
to be quite robust since it still replicates the stylized fact under alternative calibrations (see below
in 4.4.1-a.).
Parameters of the Cobb-Douglas utility function (α, μ and σ)
We know that, in the absence of saturation, the parameters α, μ and σ give the shares of income
spent in the consumptions of the agricultural good (α), the manufactured good (μ) and services
(σ). As shown in Proposition 1, at the general equilibrium of our model, they also are the share of
labor devoted to each of the three sectors during Phase I (i.e. from the beginning of the process
of development until the take off which occurs when the demand for the agricultural good reaches
saturation). There is no debate about the fact that at least 70% of the population worked in
agriculture for centuries (see empirical evidences presented in Section 2; especially Wallis et al.,
2017). Accordingly, we use this fact in order to calibrate the parameter α. Besides, we assume
that the remaining 30% are equally shared between manufacturing and services.15 Obviously, one
may wonder how reasonable it is to consider those parameters to be constant over time. Regarding
this matter, let us recall that even if the Cobb-Douglas with saturations utility function remains
unchanged over time, the saturations lead to modifications in the demand functions from phase to
the other (see Lemmas 1, 2 and 3).
4.1.2 Sectorial productivity gains
We have assumed that the evolution of the marginal productivity of labor in each sector (χAt , χ
M
t
and χSt ) is exogenous, resulting from a combination of accumulation of physical capital, of human
capital and of knowledge (see the presentation of the technologies (8) in Section 3.2). The initial
values of the parameters of these “stocks of capital” are all normalized to one at the beginning of the
period. As we consider that each sector produces a homogenous good, the retained value for the
productivity gains in each sector should correspond to the average gain observed in this sector for
the long run.16 To use the more reasonable values, we rely on the existing literature in economic
history. As we detailed below, historical evidence support the idea that the productivity gains
rose over time. A behavior that our model neglects (but that could be added in our quantitative
exercise) because this is not necessary to capture the main stylized facts. Accordingly, we favor
12According to European Coal and Steel Community (1957), per capita consumption was already around 300 kg
in the 1950s.
13Of course, this figure is rough because industry is obviously not only the producer of CO2.
14Even if rather low (compared to the ones obtained using consumption of steel or CO2 emissions), this factor is
still much higher than the ones obtained for the saturation of the demand of agricultural products.
15In 4.4.1- b., we consider alternative calibration (α = 70%, σ = 20% and μ = 10%); our key results remain.
16In 4.4.1-c., we show that our model is quite robust to the values of these parameters.
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simplicity by determining very rough rates of productivity gains over the whole period (1450-2000)
by aggregating estimations made for shorter historical periods: we compute the geometric average
of very different rates which are typical of the long period of slow growth (before 1800) and of the
more recent period of rapid growth (after 1800).
There is a rich literature assessing the productivity gains in the agriculture in the long run.
In Campbell & Overton (1996), the productivity gains in the English agriculture over the period
1300-1800 are estimated at 0.16% per year. Still in England, Clark (2002) estimates them at 0.15%
for the period 1500-1869. Hoffman (1996) finds growth rates during the Old Regime that range
from -0.16% to 0.31%, depending on French regions and on types of production. More recently, the
production of wheat has experienced productivity gains of 0.8% per year between 1750 and 1929
in norther France (Grantham, 1991). Besides, according to available data from the OECD, the
annual productivity gains in the agriculture observed in member countries between 1990 and 2009
have reached 1.86% per year.17 To summarize, the average productivity gains in the agricultural
sector have remained below 0.2% for centuries until they significantly increased over the past two
centuries. Then, a rough estimation can consist in the geometric average combining 0.2% (1450-
1800), 0.8% (1800-1950) and 1.8% (1950-2000); it thus appears reasonable to consider an average
annual productivity gain gχAt = 0.4% in the long run.
Productivity gains in manufacturing have also been extensively studied but mainly since the
Industrial Revolution. Studies have led to diverse estimations depending on authors, on industries,
and on time periods; not to mention the various methodologies used to assess these gains. Several
authors argue that the productivity gains in manufacturing during the Industrial Revolution in
England were probably relatively limited (e.g. 0.34% in Crafts, 2004). Broadberry et al. (2015)
estimate at 0.93% the yearly productivity gains in English manufacturing between 1759 and 1851.
Others have stressed high rates in some key industries: 2.3% in textiles or 1.8% in iron and
steel (Clark, 2014). Fuchs (1964) provides a figure regarding all manufactured goods which is
limited to 2.44% over 1929-1961 in the US. Field (2006) puts forward annual averages ranging
from 0.57% (1973-1989) to 5.12% (1919-1929) in the US. Data from the OECD show that member
countries have experienced annual productivity gains in manufacturing of 2.96% in average over
1990-2016. Given the diversity on the available estimations, we suggest to consider an average
annual productivity gain for the manufacturing sector gχMt = 1%. This rate can be obtained as the
geometric average of 0.2% (1450-1800) and 3% (1800-2000); or, alternatively, of 0.3% (1450-1800),
2% (1800-1950) and 4% (1950-2000).
The services sector gathers various activities. It can be argued that productivity gains in many
tertiary activities have remained almost nil in the long run; for instance, the services provided
by a monk, a teacher, or a prostitute. Some others services have experience very low gains (e.g.
barbers, professional cleaners, ...). Besides, some others enjoyed occasional important gains; let
think about the transport (train, plane, ...), or accounting (computer). When it comes to global
estimates, Fuchs (1964) observes an average productivity gain in the services amounting to 0.70%
in the US for the period 1929-1961. Regarding the more recent period, which benefits from the
ICT revolution, the average productivity gains in the “business sector services” reached 1.78% in
OECD members over the 1990-2009 period.18 Then, as a rough approximation, we retain for the
calibration an average annual productivity gain gχSt = 0.2%; which corresponds to the geometric
average of 0.01% (1450-1900), 0.7% (1900-1950) and 1.7% (1950-2000). It is important to note that
the value of this productivity parameter does not affect the capability of our model to reproduce
the stylized facts previously mentioned. In fact, the value of this parameter modifies only the
growth rate during the last period, the value of which remains an open question.
4.2 Replication of Stylized Facts
Using the calibration presented in 4.1, our model roughly reproduces the three stylized facts de-
picted above in Section 2. As mentioned above in 4.1.2, the initial levels, χA0 , χ
M
0 and χ
S
0 , of the
“stocks of capital” are all normalized to unity; accordingly (see (9) in Lemma 4), the initial price
of each of the three goods is 1.19 To give an illustrative timing, we assume that the simulated
17Data retrieved online OECD.stat (ISIC Rev.3).
18Data retrieved online OECD.stat (ISIC Rev.3). It could be argued that the recent period has in fact experienced
much lower productivity gains in the services; for instance, controlling for mismeasurement of productivity growth,
Young (2014) observes an average gain of productivity in the services of 0.2% in 18 OECD countries (1970-2005)
19Note that using different values - for instance 70, 15 and 15, that is assuming that the initial “stocks of capital”
result from a past accumulation, which would have followed the same pattern as the one leading to the initial labor
partition across the three sectors (which depends on the initial preferences of the representative household) - does
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economy starts in 1450, a date that corresponds to the end of the Hundred Years’ war, beginning
of a long period of stability favorable to development.
First, as illustrated by Figure 4, we reproduce the structural changes regarding the share of
workers in each sector. Whereas the labor partition remains the same during Phase I, the saturation
in the agricultural good allows workers to move to manufacturing and services in Phases 2 and 3.
The share of workers in manufacturing reaches a maximum to about one third while agriculture
and services employed about an identical third. This repartition was observed in western Europe
in the middle of the 20th century. Since this maximum, the share of manufacturing joins the
agricultural labor force in a gradual decline while the share in service increases. Ultimately, our
model predicts that, thanks to productivity gains, workers in the two first sectors will fall to about
nothing, services becoming the dominant occupation.
Fig. 4. Around here
The second stylized fact reproduced is the pattern of the economic growth. Because, it requires
to add goods and services that vary over time (and for those which remain, their prices also vary),
assessing economic growth is a complicated task.20 Aware of this difficulty, we use a standard
methodology to compute a measure of economic growth: the real GDP using date t = 0 (year
1450 on the figure) as the base year.21 Figure 5 represents the GDP per capita predicted by our
model. In order to provide a visual figure consistent with empirical observations, as basis we use
the GDP per capita of 1,000 US Dollar of 1990 estimated by Bolt & van Zanden (2014) for England
in 1450. Our model produces a first phase of slow but positive growth before a strong increase
during Phase II, vanishing in a new era of very limited growth in the third phase. The magnitude
of the rise of GDP per cap is higher than what is observed today in Western Europe (about 25,000
dollars instead of 65,000 in our figure); few developed countries are close to this level and maybe
the shocks resulting from wars, especially those of the 20th century could explain this difference.
Fig. 5. Around here
The third stylized fact reproduced is the evolution of prices of the three goods over time. In
Figure 6, we depict the prediction of the model over the full period, but the patterns are similar
over shorter horizons, for instance the 20th century as in Figure 3 (real prices of bread, electric
bulb and male haircut). All three prices clearly decrease. We find a decline in the price of the
manufactured good which is much more stronger than the one of the agricultural good. Besides,
the price of services follows a much slower decline; here we replicate the famous Baumol’s “cost
disease”. The underlying source of these patterns is the non-homothetic productivity gains.
Fig. 6. Around here
4.3 Additional Outcomes
In addition to these three stylized facts we reproduce here two interesting outputs of our model.
The first one is the real GDP growth rate observed over time. As seen in Figure 7, this rate,
which is below 0.60% per year at the beginning of the period, gradually increases during Phase I,
reaching a level of about 1.20% during Phase II. Our model expects very limited growth in Phase
III, period during which growth is mainly driven by the low productivity gains in services. The
abrupt changes exhibited in Figure 6 is due to the strong simplification along which we assume of
a brutal change between phases.22 A smoother pattern could be obtained using a more general
model but would induce an useless complexity. Anyway, the GDP growth rate our model produce
are highly consistent, even in magnitude, with what has been observed for developed countries.
Fig. 7. Around here
not affect the outcomes of the model.
20Jean Fourastié was highly reluctant to compute an aggregated measure of production or consumption over time.
21Using a real GDP expressed in prices of t = 0 is a way to express the increase in the standard of living enjoyed
by a household of this initial epoch). Alternatively, using a chained GDP would produce different patterns but since
the stylized facts assessed in this paper are expressed in real GDP, we obviously retain the same measure.
22In fact, the first brutal change results from the fact that at date taˉ, the marginal worker moves from agriculture
to manufacturing; the latter being characterized by much higher productivity gains than the former. Similarly, the
second jump results from the fact that at date tmˉ, the marginal worker moves from manufacturing to services; the
latter being characterized by much lower productivity gains than the former.
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The second interesting output of our model is the global productivity gains of labor observed
in the economy over time, which rely on two features: i. the productivity gains in each sector, and
ii. the structural changes in the labor partition. To assess the evolution of the overall productivity
of labor, we use an index, denoted by χt, computed as the average of the productivity levels in the
three sectors weighted by the share of labor in each sector: χt = LAt χ
A
t +L
M
t χ
M
t +L
S
t χ
S
t , where L
X
t
and χXt are the quantity of labor and the productivity of labor in each sector X (X = A,M,S).
As seen in Figure 8, during Phase I, the overall productivity of labor is stable. Then, in Phase II,
it rises as the share of labor in manufacturing increases; the maximum productivity corresponds to
the point at which the share of the labor force in manufacturing is the highest. Then, as the share
of labor in the service increases, this overall productivity of labor decreases. Note that one could
somehow be tempted to relate this outcome to the one of the Total Factor Productivity (TFP);
indeed, Figure 8 looks like the famous “one big wave” in the TFP stressed by Gordon (2000).
However, the notion of TFP is complicated to assess empirically (OECD, 2001).
Fig. 8. Around here
4.4 Robustness Exercises
4.4.1 Alternative calibrations
In this section, we investigate whether our results are dependent on the parameters we have used in
the calibration. To demonstrate the robustness of our model to the parameters used, we successively
modify several of them, maintaining others at the levels used above. To save space, we only
reproduce the outcome which we assume to be the most significant: the structural changes in the
share of workers.
a) The most delicate estimation is the saturation level of the demand for manufactured products;
the one of the demand for agricultural products seems less problematic. Instead of considering a
multiplicative factor of 400, we use successively 4,000 (resp. 100). As seen in Figures 9 and 10,
such a change delays (resp. move forward) the date at which saturation occurs and increases (resp.
reduces) the share of labor in manufacturing to be reached to get to saturation.
Fig. 9 and 10. Around here
b) A second set of alternative calibration is the initial partition of labor ( i.e. the parameters
of the Cobb-Douglas utility function α, μ and σ). There is no doubt that about 70% of the
population worked in the agriculture (thus, we retain α = 70%); however, assuming that the 30%
remaining were equally split between manufacturing and services can be criticized. Especially, it
appears that an important share of the labor force worked as servant in pre-development Europe
(Szoltysek, 2009). Accordingly, we increase the share in services σ to 20% (and thus reduce the
one in manufacturing, μ, to 10%); and then, for comparison, we test the opposite (σ = 10% and
μ = 20%). As seen in Figures 11 and 12, in both cases, the general pattern remains similar
even though the magnitude of the increase in the share of labor in manufacturing varies quite
significantly.
Fig. 11 and 12. Around here
c) A third set of alternative calibration relates to the productivity gains rates we have used.
Instead of the numbers we have retained as explained in 4.1.2, we double (resp. halve) the three
rates. As seen in Figures 13 and 14, the main patterns are similar except that saturations occur
earlier (resp. later, in fact so much later that the saturation in manufactured products is not
observed on our timing), and with little differences in the labor repartition.
Fig. 13 and 14. Around here
4.4.2 Modeling the Roman economy
A final exercise is to modify the parameters to fit the main characteristics of the Roman economy. 23
Since human being remains the same over time, we can assume that saturation levels were rather
23We focus on the case of the Roman economy but other historical episode such as the Pharaonic Egypt or the
Imperial China were about similar.
14
identical in Antiquity. The saturation in agricultural products has been probably reached during
the Roman times. Evidence of this saturation in is offered by the share of labor devoted to other
activities than agriculture (important urban population, soldiers). A second evidence is the use of
harvester in Gaul as documented by writing and engraving.24 This machine collecting ears thanks
to a kind of comb pushed by beefs saved human labor but wasted important part of the crop. Such
an arbitrage testifies that the value of grain in term of wage was already low. But, despite this
high productivity level in agriculture, the Romans never experienced something comparable to the
industrial revolution never reaching the saturation in manufactured products. On the contrary,
services were well developed as indicated by the numbers of baths and public arenas; 41 arenas
have been identified in Gaul with at least ten receiving more than 20,000 spectators. The labor
freed from agricultural work was transferred to manufacturing but also to services at a large scale.
Such an economy can be reproduced within our model by modifying only the productivity gains
observed in the manufacturing sector. Let us assume that the productivity gains in manufacturing
were identical to the ones in agriculture (0.40%). This assumption can be legitimated by the fact
that even if, by its deep nature, manufacturing is more sensitive to technical progress, the conditions
of the Roman time did not allow this higher propensity to express it. The lack of printing could
have made much more difficult the spread of one innovation in manufacturing whereas innovation
in agriculture could diffuse thanks to contagion because this activity is geographically continuous.
More generally, it can be argued that since then, the past millennium has seen several General
Purpose Technologies (GPTs) affecting more strongly manufacturing (e.g. waterwheel, steam,
electricity).25 Another rationale could be that the stock of knowledge and capital was much lower
in manufacturing at this time: since Neolithic and the beginning of agriculture, human civilization
focused on food production rather than on manufacturing.
Assuming productivity in manufacturing identical to the one in agriculture, both the share of
service and manufacturing increases after saturation in food production but despite centuries, the
saturation is far to be reached in manufactured products. Regarding the GDP (based at 1), this
economy enjoyed a growing increase but never experienced the abrupt rise observed in western
Europe after 1800.
Fig. 15 and 16. Around here
In our model, the fall of the Roman Empire following the Great Migration means a destruction
of the “stocks of capital” χAt , χ
M
t and χ
S
t (i.e. destruction of physical and human capital, loss of
knowledge). These destructions led to a fall in the productivity and to the well-documented fall
in consumption per capita. The Carolingian domination started a new phase of stable institutions
allowing another episode of development imposing to starting from close to scratch the process.
This second episode culminated at the beginning of the second millennium. At this time, the
saturation was reached again in agricultural products, allowing a large part of the labor force to
be dedicated to other activities (Crusades or building cathedrals). The Great Plague of 1348 and
the Hundred Years’ war reduced a second time the “stocks of capital”. The stability reached again
from 1450 allowed the third episode of development we have described in this paper. This episode
was long enough and with productivity gains high enough to permit to reach for the first time in
human history the saturation in manufactured goods.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduces a new theoretical framework to assess economic development, which formal-
izes the analysis proposed by Jean Fourastié (1949). Our model assumes three sectors characterized
by different productivity gains (high in manufacturing, medium in agriculture and low in services)
and saturations of the demands for agricultural and manufactured goods. These two set of assump-
tions are supported by important historical evidence. Adopting a simple general equilibrium model
(in particular, we consider Cobb-Douglas utility function and one factor Cobb-Douglas production
functions), the derived quantities (per capita consumptions and labor partition) and prices match
well three major observed stylized facts. First, the theoretical results depict structural changes
in the labor partition across the three sector. More precisely, the equilibrium partition of lab or
24The large presence of low-cost labor through slavery in Italian peninsula seems to explain why harvester was
not use there.
25For more details on GPTs, see Bresnahan & Trajtenberg (1995).
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experiences three phases: 1. constant labor partition until saturation in the demand for agri-
cultural good occurs, 2. reallocation of the labor force from agriculture into manufacturing and
services until saturation in the demand for manufactured good occurs, and 3. constant increase in
the share of services. Second, the model exhibits three phases of different growth regimes (a first
period of low secular growth turning to a period of fast growth before reaching a new stable phase,
potentially of secular stagnation). Third, the model captures well the patterns of the evolution of
relative prices in each of the three sectors. Furthermore, not only our theoretical results replicate
these stylized facts, but calibrated with reasonable values, the model also predicts patterns very
close, even in magnitude and timing, to the ones observed in economic history (these results are
robust to the use of alternative calibrations).
Following the principle to favor simplicity, we have presented a unmannerly version of our
model because more complexity turns out to be unnecessary to capture the hereinbefore mentioned
stylized facts. In fact, keeping this first version simple enables us to testify its robust ability to
capture major stylized facts. For the model to be more realistic, one could consider several obvious
extensions. The utility function could be refined to consider less abrupt occurrences of saturations;
thus providing predictions of smoother changes from one phase to the other. Technical progress
could be endogenized, thus enabling us to consider more accurate evolution of the productivity
gains over time (instead of assuming rough averages ones). Besides, the capability of our model
to help in the understanding of other economic issues can also be investigated. Including physical
capital in the model would enables us to determine an interest rate; this would help explain its
historical evolution, especially the recent strong decrease. Including land would provide some
insight on the evolution of its market value over time. Considering interactions between two
countries experiencing different phases within the process of development could enables us to
provide some new insights on international trade. Finally, introducing a distinction between high
and low skilled labor - especially in the services - could help understand the recent polarization in
the job market.
16
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Appendix – Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Sectoral shares of employment and Value added – selected developed 
countries 1800-2000.  
Source: Herrendorf et al. (2014), section 6.2.2.2., Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 2. GDP per capita in England and Netherland, 1300-2015. 
Source: Bolt & van Zanden (2014) updated to 2015 according to world bank 
database.  
 
 
 
 Fig. 3. Real prices of three typical goods. 
Source: Comité Fourastié –retrieved from the internet in October 2016. 
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Fig. A. General equilibrium result: structural changes in the labor 
partition. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. B. General equilibrium result: evolution of per capita consumptions. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. C. General equilibrium result: evolution of the prices (initial prices 
and wage normalized to one). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Share of the labor force in the three sectors (standard 
calibration). 
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Fig. 5. Real GDP per capita expressed in 1990 US dollars (standard 
calibration). 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Prices of the three goods expressed in wage (standard calibration). 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 7. Real GDP growth rate (st. calib.) Fig. 8 Global productivity gains 
(st. Calib.)      
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Fig. 9 and 10. Structural changes using saturation in manufactured products 
at 4,000 (left) and 100 (right) times the initial level. 
 
  
Fig. 11 and 12. Structural changes using 20% in services and 10% in 
manufacturing (left) and the opposite (right) as Cobb-Douglas parameters. 
 
 
Fig. 13 and 14. Structural changes using productivity gains multiplied by 
two (left) and divided by two (right). 
 
 
  
Fig. 15 and 16. Structural change (right) and GDP (left) of the “Roman 
economy.” 
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